"Systematically reviews code for SQL injection, XSS, SSRF, broken access control, cryptographic failures, and other common OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities, providing vulnerable code examples and ready-to-use remediation guidance. Trigger this skill when users ask for a security review, vulnerability scan, or penetration testing assistance, or mention keywords like OWASP, SQL injection, XSS, code audit, or security checklist."
Resources
1Install
npx skillscat add zebbern/claude-code-guide/secure-code-review Install via the SkillsCat registry.
OWASP Top 10 Code Security Review Checklist
A systematic security review based on the OWASP Top 10 (2021) standard. Each item includes: vulnerability description, typical vulnerable code, inspection checkpoints, and remediation examples. Designed for security-focused code review of web applications.
Usage
Provide the code files or code snippets to review, and specify which OWASP categories to check (or request a full review) to receive an item-by-item audit report.
Example prompts:
- "Check this code for SQL injection risks"
- "Run a full OWASP Top 10 security review on this project"
- "Does this API endpoint have any SSRF vulnerabilities?"
Quick Reference
| ID | Category | Key Check |
|---|---|---|
| A01 | Broken Access Control | Does every endpoint verify the current user's identity? Can users access others' data by changing IDs? |
| A02 | Cryptographic Failures | Are passwords hashed with bcrypt/argon2? Are secrets hardcoded? |
| A03 | Injection | String-concatenated SQL? shell=True? Unescaped template output? |
| A04 | Insecure Design | Is rate limiting in place? Can critical workflows be bypassed? |
| A05 | Security Misconfiguration | DEBUG enabled? Stack traces in error pages? Default credentials? |
| A06 | Vulnerable Components | Any CVEs from pip audit / npm audit? |
| A07 | Authentication Failures | Is JWT signature verified? Can tokens be revoked? Is MFA available? |
| A08 | Integrity Failures | Any pickle.loads deserializing untrusted data? |
| A09 | Logging & Monitoring Failures | Are plaintext passwords in logs? Are failed logins recorded? |
| A10 | SSRF | Are user-supplied URLs filtered against internal IPs? |
Review Process SOP
Core principle: prefer false positives over missed true positives.
- Define scope — Identify the files, modules, or code snippets to review
- Full coverage check — Scan through A01-A10 sequentially. Every item must appear in the report (mark items with no findings as pass). The default behavior is to only report issues found — this process requires full coverage to ensure nothing is missed
- Risk classification — Label each finding:
- RED High: Directly exploitable (RCE, SQL injection, SSRF reaching internal networks, plaintext password storage)
- YELLOW Medium: Exploitable under specific conditions (missing rate limiting, weak password policy, static tokens)
- GREEN Low: Defense-in-depth gap with no direct exploitation path (missing security headers, insufficient logging)
- Every finding must include ready-to-use fix code (actual code, not just a description). Reference specific
file:line_number - Output the review report — Use the template below, findings sorted by severity descending, with a prioritized remediation list at the end
A01:2021 — Broken Access Control
Risk: Users can access other users' data or perform unauthorized operations.
Checkpoints:
- Does every API endpoint enforce authorization?
- Are there IDOR vulnerabilities (Insecure Direct Object References) — can users access others' data by modifying ID parameters?
- Do admin interfaces verify roles?
- Is access control enforced server-side (not just by hiding UI elements)?
- Is the CORS policy overly permissive?
Vulnerable Code Example
# ❌ Vulnerable: No authorization check — any user can view others' orders by changing user_id
@app.route("/api/orders/<user_id>")
def get_orders(user_id):
orders = db.query(f"SELECT * FROM orders WHERE user_id = {user_id}")
return jsonify(orders)Remediation Example
# ✅ Fixed: Verify the authenticated user can only access their own data
@app.route("/api/orders")
@login_required
def get_orders():
current_user_id = get_current_user().id
orders = db.query("SELECT * FROM orders WHERE user_id = %s", (current_user_id,))
return jsonify(orders)A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
Risk: Sensitive data (passwords, credit card numbers, personal information) is unencrypted or uses weak cryptographic algorithms.
Checkpoints:
- Are passwords stored using secure hashing (bcrypt/scrypt/argon2) rather than MD5/SHA1?
- Is HTTPS enforced for sensitive data in transit?
- Are encryption keys hardcoded in the source code?
- Are deprecated cryptographic algorithms in use (DES, RC4, MD5)?
- Are sensitive database fields encrypted at rest?
Vulnerable Code Example
# ❌ Vulnerable: MD5 for password storage, hardcoded secret key
import hashlib
SECRET_KEY = "my-secret-key-123"
def save_password(password):
hashed = hashlib.md5(password.encode()).hexdigest()
db.save(hashed)Remediation Example
# ✅ Fixed: bcrypt for password hashing, secret key from environment variable
import bcrypt
import os
SECRET_KEY = os.environ["SECRET_KEY"]
def save_password(password):
salt = bcrypt.gensalt()
hashed = bcrypt.hashpw(password.encode(), salt)
db.save(hashed)A03:2021 — Injection
Risk: User input is concatenated directly into SQL, OS commands, LDAP queries, etc., allowing attackers to execute arbitrary queries or commands.
Checkpoints:
- Do SQL queries use parameterized queries / ORM (not string concatenation)?
- Are there
os.system()orsubprocess.call(shell=True)calls that concatenate user input? - Does template rendering properly escape user input (preventing XSS)?
- Are special characters filtered in LDAP / XPath / NoSQL queries?
- Are unfiltered user inputs logged directly (log injection)?
SQL Injection — Vulnerable Code
# ❌ Vulnerable: String-concatenated SQL — attacker can input ' OR 1=1 --
@app.route("/api/user")
def get_user():
username = request.args.get("username")
query = f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = '{username}'"
result = db.execute(query)
return jsonify(result)SQL Injection — Remediation
# ✅ Fixed: Parameterized query
@app.route("/api/user")
def get_user():
username = request.args.get("username")
result = db.execute(
"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = %s",
(username,)
)
return jsonify(result)Command Injection — Vulnerable Code
# ❌ Vulnerable: User input concatenated directly into shell command
import os
def ping_host(host):
os.system(f"ping -c 4 {host}")Command Injection — Remediation
# ✅ Fixed: Use subprocess with list arguments, shell disabled
import subprocess
import re
def ping_host(host):
if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9.\-]+$', host):
raise ValueError("Invalid hostname")
subprocess.run(["ping", "-c", "4", host], check=True)A04:2021 — Insecure Design
Risk: Business logic design flaws that cannot be fixed by a perfect implementation.
Checkpoints:
- Do critical operations have rate limiting?
- Can the password reset flow be abused (username enumeration, verification code brute-force)?
- Do sensitive operations (payments, transfers) require secondary confirmation?
- Are there batch operation endpoints with no upper limit?
- Can business workflows be executed out of order (e.g., skipping payment to complete an order)?
Vulnerable Code Example
# ❌ Vulnerable: No attempt limit on verification code — can be brute-forced
@app.route("/api/verify-code", methods=["POST"])
def verify_code():
code = request.json["code"]
stored_code = session.get("verification_code")
if code == stored_code:
return jsonify({"status": "verified"})
return jsonify({"status": "invalid"}), 400Remediation Example
# ✅ Fixed: Added attempt limit and expiration
@app.route("/api/verify-code", methods=["POST"])
def verify_code():
attempts = session.get("verify_attempts", 0)
if attempts >= 5:
return jsonify({"error": "Too many attempts, please request a new code"}), 429
code = request.json["code"]
stored = session.get("verification_code")
expire_at = session.get("code_expire_at", 0)
if time.time() > expire_at:
return jsonify({"error": "Verification code has expired"}), 400
session["verify_attempts"] = attempts + 1
if code == stored:
session.pop("verify_attempts", None)
return jsonify({"status": "verified"})
return jsonify({"status": "invalid"}), 400A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
Risk: Applications or servers use default configurations, enable unnecessary features, or expose sensitive information in error messages.
Checkpoints:
- Is DEBUG mode disabled in production?
- Do error pages leak stack traces, database versions, etc.?
- Are default credentials still in use?
- Do HTTP responses include security headers (X-Frame-Options, Content-Security-Policy, etc.)?
- Are unnecessary HTTP methods (PUT, DELETE, TRACE) disabled?
- Is directory listing disabled?
Vulnerable Code Example
# ❌ Vulnerable: DEBUG enabled in production, leaking sensitive information
app = Flask(__name__)
app.config["DEBUG"] = True
app.config["SECRET_KEY"] = "default-secret"
@app.errorhandler(500)
def error_handler(e):
return jsonify({"error": str(e), "traceback": traceback.format_exc()}), 500Remediation Example
# ✅ Fixed: Configuration from environment variables, DEBUG off in production
import os
app = Flask(__name__)
app.config["DEBUG"] = os.environ.get("FLASK_DEBUG", "false").lower() == "true"
app.config["SECRET_KEY"] = os.environ["FLASK_SECRET_KEY"]
@app.errorhandler(500)
def error_handler(e):
app.logger.error(f"Internal error: {e}")
return jsonify({"error": "Internal server error, please try again later"}), 500A06:2021 — Vulnerable and Outdated Components
Risk: Using third-party libraries or framework versions with known vulnerabilities.
Checkpoints:
- Do dependencies have known CVEs (scan with
pip audit,npm audit,snyk, etc.)? - Are there dependencies that haven't been updated in a long time?
- Are any unmaintained libraries in use?
- Are lock files (package-lock.json / requirements.txt) under version control?
- Is there an automated dependency update mechanism (Dependabot, etc.)?
Scan Commands
# Python projects
pip audit
# Node.js projects
npm audit
# General scanning
# Use open-source tools like trivy or grype to scan container/project dependenciesRemediation Guidance
# Update vulnerable packages
pip install --upgrade package_name
# Auto-fix npm vulnerabilities
npm audit fix
# Pin dependency versions to prevent implicit upgrades
pip freeze > requirements.txtA07:2021 — Identification and Authentication Failures
Risk: Authentication mechanisms have flaws that allow brute-force attacks, credential stuffing, or session hijacking.
Checkpoints:
- Is there a login failure rate limit (account lockout / delay)?
- Is the password policy reasonable (minimum length, complexity requirements)?
- Are session tokens invalidated on logout?
- Are session IDs sufficiently random and unpredictable?
- Is MFA supported for sensitive operations?
- Are JWT tokens validated for signature and expiration?
Vulnerable Code Example
# ❌ Vulnerable: JWT signature not verified, accepts alg=none
import jwt
def verify_token(token):
payload = jwt.decode(token, options={"verify_signature": False})
return payloadRemediation Example
# ✅ Fixed: Enforce signature and expiration verification, specify algorithm
import jwt
import os
JWT_SECRET = os.environ["JWT_SECRET"]
def verify_token(token):
try:
payload = jwt.decode(
token,
JWT_SECRET,
algorithms=["HS256"],
options={"require": ["exp", "iat", "sub"]}
)
return payload
except jwt.ExpiredSignatureError:
raise AuthError("Token has expired")
except jwt.InvalidTokenError:
raise AuthError("Invalid token")A08:2021 — Software and Data Integrity Failures
Risk: Failure to verify the integrity of software updates, critical data, or CI/CD pipelines, enabling supply chain attacks or data tampering.
Checkpoints:
- Does deserialization use unsafe methods (e.g., Python's
pickle.loadson untrusted data)? - Does the CI/CD pipeline have integrity verification?
- Do third-party CDN resources use SRI (Subresource Integrity)?
- Are modifications to critical configuration files audit-logged?
- Does the auto-update mechanism verify signatures?
Vulnerable Code Example
# ❌ Vulnerable: Deserializing untrusted data — can lead to remote code execution
import pickle
@app.route("/api/import", methods=["POST"])
def import_data():
data = pickle.loads(request.data)
process(data)
return "OK"Remediation Example
# ✅ Fixed: Use a safe data format (JSON), refuse to deserialize arbitrary objects
import json
@app.route("/api/import", methods=["POST"])
def import_data():
try:
data = json.loads(request.data)
except json.JSONDecodeError:
return jsonify({"error": "Invalid JSON format"}), 400
process(data)
return "OK"A09:2021 — Security Logging and Monitoring Failures
Risk: Lack of security event logging and monitoring, preventing timely detection and response to attacks.
Checkpoints:
- Are login successes and failures logged?
- Are sensitive operations (permission changes, data deletion) audit-logged?
- Are passwords, tokens, or other sensitive data accidentally included in logs?
- Are logs tamper-resistant (centralized storage, append-only writes)?
- Are alerts configured for anomalous behavior (e.g., burst of failed logins)?
Vulnerable Code Example
# ❌ Vulnerable: No logging on login failure, and plaintext password in logs
def login(username, password):
user = db.get_user(username)
if not user or not check_password(password, user.password_hash):
print(f"Login failed for {username} with password {password}")
return None
return create_session(user)Remediation Example
# ✅ Fixed: Log security events without logging sensitive data
import logging
security_logger = logging.getLogger("security")
def login(username, password):
user = db.get_user(username)
if not user or not check_password(password, user.password_hash):
security_logger.warning(
"Login failed",
extra={"username": username, "ip": request.remote_addr}
)
return None
security_logger.info(
"Login successful",
extra={"username": username, "ip": request.remote_addr}
)
return create_session(user)A10:2021 — Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Risk: The application accepts user-provided URLs and makes server-side requests, allowing attackers to access internal network resources or cloud metadata.
Checkpoints:
- Are there features that accept user-supplied URLs and make server-side requests (image fetching, URL previews, webhook callbacks)?
- Is the URL protocol restricted (allow only http/https)?
- Are internal IP ranges filtered (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16)?
- Is the cloud metadata address blocked (169.254.169.254)?
- Is there protection against DNS rebinding attacks?
Vulnerable Code Example
# ❌ Vulnerable: Directly requesting user-supplied URL — can access internal network and cloud metadata
import requests
@app.route("/api/fetch-url")
def fetch_url():
url = request.args.get("url")
response = requests.get(url)
return response.textRemediation Example
# ✅ Fixed: Validate URL protocol and target address, block internal network access
import requests
import ipaddress
from urllib.parse import urlparse
import socket
BLOCKED_NETWORKS = [
ipaddress.ip_network("127.0.0.0/8"),
ipaddress.ip_network("10.0.0.0/8"),
ipaddress.ip_network("172.16.0.0/12"),
ipaddress.ip_network("192.168.0.0/16"),
ipaddress.ip_network("169.254.0.0/16"),
]
def is_safe_url(url):
parsed = urlparse(url)
if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
return False
try:
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(socket.gethostbyname(parsed.hostname))
for network in BLOCKED_NETWORKS:
if ip in network:
return False
except (socket.gaierror, ValueError):
return False
return True
@app.route("/api/fetch-url")
def fetch_url():
url = request.args.get("url")
if not is_safe_url(url):
return jsonify({"error": "Access to this address is not allowed"}), 403
response = requests.get(url, timeout=10, allow_redirects=False)
return response.textReview Report Template
After completing the review, output a report in the following format. All 10 items must appear — mark items with no findings as pass:
# OWASP Top 10 Security Review Report
## Review Summary
- Scope: [list of files/modules]
- Date: [date]
- Risk summary: RED High x | YELLOW Medium x | GREEN Low x | PASS No findings x
## Findings (sorted by severity, descending)
### [Severity] [OWASP ID] — [Issue Title]
- **Location:** [file:line_number]
- **Description:** [issue description]
- **Impact:** [potential consequences]
- **Fix:** (ready-to-use code, not just a description)
### PASS A0X — [Category] — No issues found
## Remediation Priority
1. [Most urgent fix — rationale]
2. [Next priority — rationale]
3. ...Recommended Open-Source Security Tools
| Tool | Language | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
bandit |
Python | Python code security scanning |
semgrep |
Multi-language | Rule-based code scanning |
eslint-plugin-security |
JavaScript | JS security rules |
npm audit / pip audit |
JS / Python | Dependency vulnerability scanning |
trivy |
Multi-language | Container and dependency scanning |
sqlmap |
— | SQL injection detection |
OWASP ZAP |
— | Web application dynamic scanning |
Note: This checklist is a supplementary review tool and does not replace professional penetration testing. For high-security systems, combine automated scanning + manual code audit + penetration testing.