"Adversarial verification of a completed task — tries to break the implementation through edge cases, error paths, security probes, and concurrency attacks. Required for Critical/Sensitive tiers (conditionally for Standard with impl files). Use after execute-plan dod-recheck PASS."
Resources
1Install
npx skillscat add shuymn/dotfiles/adversarial-verify Install via the SkillsCat registry.
Path Resolution
<skill-root>means the directory containing thisSKILL.md.- Resolve
scripts/...andreferences/...relative to<skill-root>, not the caller's current working directory. - When executing local helpers, use explicit paths such as
<skill-root>/scripts/....
Constraints
- The adversarial agent must NOT have implemented or DoD-rechecked the task — triple independence is required. Reason: the implementing and rechecking agents share context and assumptions; a third independent perspective is needed to find the blind spots that confirmation bias hides.
- Do NOT modify implementation code. Write only the adversarial report and attack test files. Reason: modifying code during adversarial verification would invalidate the DoD recheck evidence and conflate "finding vulnerabilities" with "fixing them."
- Attack test files must be clearly separated from production tests (use a dedicated directory or naming convention such as
*_adversarial_test.*).
Gate
Before starting adversarial verification, verify the dod-recheck gate:
- Run
skit gate-check <review-file> <source-file>. - The dod-recheck file must exist, contain
Overall Verdict: PASS, and the Source Digest must match the current plan file. - If the gate check fails, stop as
BLOCKEDand request the user to runexecute-plan dod-recheckfirst.
Tier-Based Invocation Policy
| Risk Tier | Invocation | Minimum Probes | Attack Scope |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | Mandatory | 3 | All applicable categories |
| Sensitive | Mandatory | 2 | Category 1 (Input Boundary) + most relevant 1 additional category |
| Standard (impl) | Conditional Mandatory | 1 | Most relevant 1 category |
| Standard (non-impl) | Optional | — | User-selected |
Implementation file definition: Same as dod-recheck-mode.md Standard Inspection — Files in Create/Modify entries whose paths do NOT match any of: *test*, *spec*, *.md, docs/*, *.txt. Standard (impl) applies when the task's Files block contains at least one implementation file.
Input
- Plan bundle path + task ID
- Adversarial Verify Input block (from execute-plan implement mode's Step 3 output)
- Implementation files listed in the input block
For Standard (non-impl) tasks (optional invocation), the Adversarial Verify Input block is not auto-generated. The user must manually provide equivalent information (Task ID, Change Areas, Implementation Files, DoD Evidence).
Procedure
- Generate Header: Run
skit digest-stamp adversarial-verify <plan-file>to produce the verification metadata header. - Load Context: Read the Adversarial Verify Input block, all implementation files listed, and
references/attack-vectors.md(including the## Project-Specific Vectorssection). - Select Attack Categories: Based on the Change Areas and Change Rationale, select applicable attack categories from the reference. Do NOT blindly apply all categories — choose only those relevant to the actual change. If
## Project-Specific Vectorscontains vectors matching the change characteristics, include them as additional probe targets regardless of the selected categories. - Execute Attacks: For each selected attack vector:
- Design a concrete test or probe targeting the implementation.
- Create the test file (naming:
*_adversarial_test.*or in a dedicatedadversarial/directory). - Execute the test/probe.
- Record: attack vector, test file, command executed, exit code, result (DEFENDED / VULNERABLE), evidence.
- Enforce tier minimums:
- Critical: execute at least 3 probes.
- Sensitive: execute at least 2 probes including Category 1 (Input Boundary) and the most relevant additional category.
- Standard (impl): execute at least 1 probe using the most relevant category.
- Standard (non-impl): no minimum probe count.
[required]vector coverage — this step defines coverage obligations;attack-vectors.mdprovides the tags.[required]marks minimum-coverage vectors; non-required vectors remain applicable and should be probed when relevant — the tag does not grant skip permission.- Critical / Sensitive: cover all
[required]vectors within selected categories. For each: (a) execute a probe, or (b) document why it is non-applicable. Uncovered[required]vectors without documented rationale →Overall Verdict: FAIL. - Standard (impl): cover the single most relevant
[required]vector in the selected category. - Standard (non-impl): no
[required]coverage obligation.
- Critical / Sensitive: cover all
- Coverage Gate: Run
skit adversarial-coverage-check <report-file> <skill-root>/references/attack-vectors.md --tier <tier>.SKIP: Standard tier (no [required] coverage obligation) — proceed.FAIL: one or more [required] vectors are uncovered without documented N/A rationale →Overall Verdict: FAIL.
- Compute Verdict:
Overall Verdict: PASSonly when ALL attack probes result in DEFENDED and the Coverage Gate is PASS. Any VULNERABLE or coverage FAIL →Overall Verdict: FAIL. - Write Report: Output to
...-task-<N>.adversarial.md. - Write file paths in repository-relative form. If you mention a skill helper command, render it as
scripts/<name>.sh, never an absolute filesystem path.
Edge Cases
- Zero applicable attack categories: If the Selection Guidance table yields no relevant categories for the change area, apply tier-based fallbacks:
- Critical / Sensitive: categories 1 (Input Boundary) and 2 (Error Handling) as baseline.
- Standard (impl): category 1 (Input Boundary) only (1 probe minimum).
- Standard (non-impl): user judgment (optional invocation).
Record the rationale for limited applicability in the report.
- Standard (impl) invocation: The Adversarial Verify Input block is auto-generated (same as Sensitive/Critical). Tier minimums and
[required]coverage rules are defined in Step 4. - Missing test infrastructure: If the project lacks a test framework or runtime needed to execute attack probes, stop as
BLOCKEDand request the user to set up the necessary infrastructure. Do not skip attacks because tooling is absent. - Attack probe budget:
- Critical: minimum 3 probes, target 3-8, cap at 15.
- Sensitive: minimum 2 probes, target 2-4, cap at 8.
- Standard (impl): minimum 1 probe, target 1-2, cap at 4.
- Standard (non-impl): choose probe count by scope and document rationale.
On FAIL
- Task completion is revoked — the task is not considered done.
- The full chain must be re-executed:
execute-plan(implement)→execute-plan(dod-recheck)→adversarial-verify. - Report specific vulnerabilities with reproduction steps.
- After the FAIL→fix→re-execute chain completes with PASS, append each discovered vulnerability to
references/attack-vectors.mdunder## Project-Specific Vectors. Format:- **[Category]: [Vector Name]**: [Description and attack method]. Source: Task N, YYYY-MM-DD.
Output Format
# <Topic> - Task <N> Adversarial Verification
## Verification Metadata
<digest-stamp.sh output>
- **Overall Verdict**: PASS | FAIL
## Attack Summary
| # | Category | Attack Vector | Required? | Test File | Command | Exit Code | Result | Evidence |
|---|----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|---------|-----------|--------|----------|
| 1 | [category] | [vector] | yes/no | [file] | `[command]` | [code] | DEFENDED/VULNERABLE | [brief evidence] |
## Vulnerabilities Found
<!-- Only present when Overall Verdict is FAIL -->
| # | Attack Vector | Severity | Reproduction | Suggested Fix |
|---|--------------|----------|--------------|---------------|
| 1 | [vector] | [critical/high/medium] | [steps] | [suggestion] |
## Decision
- Task <N> adversarial verification: PASS/FAIL
- Reason: [rationale]Task Completion Definition (with Adversarial Verification)
For Critical-tier and Sensitive-tier tasks, completion requires ALL three conditions:
- Implement mode: All RED/GREEN/REFACTOR/DoD steps pass.
- DoD Recheck mode: Independent sub-agent confirms all DoD items pass.
- Adversarial Verify: Independent sub-agent confirms all attack probes are defended.
If adversarial-verify returns FAIL, the implement completion is revoked and the full chain must be re-executed.
For Standard (non-impl) tasks, adversarial verification remains optional unless explicitly required by the user or plan. For Standard (impl) tasks, adversarial verification (1 probe) is conditionally mandatory.