Circuit Breakers and Retries

TL;DR: Retries amplify exponentially across layers (3 retries × 4 layers = 64× origin load). Always pair retries with a circuit breaker, full-jitter exponential backoff (random(0, min(cap, base * 2^attempt))), a per-request attempt cap (3), and a per-client retry-ratio budget (10% per Google SRE). Set absolute deadlines at the edge and propagate them — "you don't get credit for late assignments with RPCs." Hystrix is dead since 2018; use Resilience4j (JVM) or Polly (.NET).

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Jump to your fire

Symptom	Section
"Cascading failures took down everything"	Retry amplification math
"What state machine should the breaker have?"	Circuit breaker states
"How long to wait between retries?"	Backoff with jitter
"When NOT to retry?"	Retry decision rules
"Deadline propagation"	Deadlines
"Slow calls dragging down the system"	Slow-call rate

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Decision diagram

flowchart TD
  A[Outbound call to dependency] --> B{Past circuit breaker — OPEN?}
  B -->|OPEN| C[Fail fast<br/>CallNotPermittedException]
  B -->|HALF_OPEN| D{Within probe-call quota?}
  D -->|No| C
  D -->|Yes| E[Allow call]
  B -->|CLOSED| E
  E --> F{Call succeeds?}
  F -->|Yes| G[Record success<br/>respect deadline]
  F -->|No, retriable error| H{Retry budget remaining?<br/>per-request &lt;3 AND<br/>per-client retry-ratio &lt;10%}
  H -->|No| I[Return failure to caller<br/>'overloaded; don't retry']
  H -->|Yes| J[Wait full-jitter delay<br/>random 0..min cap, base*2^n]
  J --> K{Time left in deadline?}
  K -->|No| I
  K -->|Yes| E
  F -->|No, non-retriable<br/>4xx malformed, auth| I
  G --> L[Update breaker stats<br/>failure rate / slow call rate]
  C --> L

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1. The retry amplification math

From Google SRE Book Ch. 22 (Addressing Cascading Failures):

Avoid amplifying retries by issuing retries at multiple levels: a single request at the highest layer may produce a number of attempts as large as the product of the number of attempts at each layer to the lowest layer. If the database can't service requests because it's overloaded, and the backend, frontend, and JavaScript layers all issue 3 retries (4 attempts), then a single user action may create 64 attempts (4³) on the database.

The rule that follows: retry only at the layer immediately above the failing dependency. Lower layers should return "overloaded; don't retry" — typically HTTP 503 with Retry-After, or a domain-specific non-retriable error.

The two-budget defense (Google SRE Book Ch. 21)

First, we implement a per-request retry budget of up to three attempts. If a request has already failed three times, we let the failure bubble up to the caller.

Secondly, we implement a per-client retry budget. Each client keeps track of the ratio of requests that correspond to retries. A request will only be retried as long as this ratio is below 10%.

Although we've effectively capped the growth caused by retries, a threefold increase in requests is significant... However, layering on the per-client retry budget (a 10% retry ratio) reduces the growth to just 1.1x in the general case—a significant improvement.

These two together — min(3 attempts, 10% retry ratio) — turn 3× worst-case into 1.1× typical-case.

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2. The circuit breaker state machine

From Resilience4j docs:

The CircuitBreaker is implemented via a finite state machine with three normal states: CLOSED, OPEN and HALF_OPEN and three special states METRICS_ONLY, DISABLED and FORCED_OPEN.

The state of the CircuitBreaker changes from CLOSED to OPEN when the failure rate is equal or greater than a configurable threshold... The CircuitBreaker also changes from CLOSED to OPEN when the percentage of slow calls is equal or greater than a configurable threshold. This helps to reduce the load on an external system before it is actually unresponsive.

The CircuitBreaker rejects calls with a CallNotPermittedException when it is OPEN. After a wait time duration has elapsed, the CircuitBreaker state changes from OPEN to HALF_OPEN and permits a configurable number of calls to see if the backend is still unavailable or has become available again... If the failure rate or slow call rate is then equal or greater than the configured threshold, the state changes back to OPEN. If [...] is below the threshold, the state changes back to CLOSED.

Resilience4j defaults (verbatim)

Property	Default	Meaning
failureRateThreshold	50 (%)	CLOSED→OPEN trigger
slowCallRateThreshold	100 (%)	Disabled by default; enable for latency-driven trip
slowCallDurationThreshold	60_000 ms	Above this = "slow"
permittedNumberOfCallsInHalfOpenState	10	Probe count
slidingWindowType	COUNT_BASED	Or TIME_BASED (per-second buckets)
slidingWindowSize	100	calls (count) or seconds (time)
minimumNumberOfCalls	100	Floor before rate is computed
waitDurationInOpenState	60_000 ms	OPEN→HALF_OPEN delay

The slow-call rate is Resilience4j's improvement past Hystrix: trip on latency, not just errors. By the time errors start, the dependency is already over the cliff. Slow-call detection gives you a leading indicator.

From Microsoft's Circuit Breaker pattern doc

The Half-Open state helps prevent a recovering service from suddenly being flooded with requests. As a service recovers, it might be able to support a limited volume of requests until the recovery is complete.

The Circuit Breaker pattern serves a different purpose than the Retry pattern. The Retry pattern enables an application to retry an operation with the expectation that it eventually succeeds. The Circuit Breaker pattern prevents an application from performing an operation that's likely to fail.

The right combo: retry inside a circuit breaker. Retry handles transient failures; the breaker handles persistent failures. The retry logic must check for CallNotPermittedException and not retry through it.

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3. Backoff with jitter: Full Jitter wins

From Marc Brooker's AWS blog post:

The three formulas:

# Full Jitter (recommended for most cases)
sleep = random_between(0, min(cap, base * 2 ** attempt))

# Equal Jitter
temp  = min(cap, base * 2 ** attempt)
sleep = temp/2 + random_between(0, temp/2)

# Decorrelated Jitter
sleep = min(cap, random_between(base, sleep_prev * 3))

Brooker's verdict (verbatim):

The no-jitter exponential backoff approach is the clear loser. It not only takes more work, but also takes more time than the jittered approaches.

Of the jittered approaches, 'Equal Jitter' is the loser. It does slightly more work than 'Full Jitter', and takes much longer. The decision between 'Decorrelated Jitter' and 'Full Jitter' is less clear.

The return on implementation complexity of using jittered backoff is huge, and it should be considered a standard approach for remote clients.

Default recipe: Full Jitter, base = 50ms to 200ms, cap = 30s to 60s.

function delayMs(attempt, base = 100, cap = 30_000) {
  return Math.floor(Math.random() * Math.min(cap, base * 2 ** attempt))
}

Why no-jitter is the killer: every retry from every client lands at the same instant after the upstream blip. Exponential backoff without jitter doesn't spread retries — it synchronizes them.

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4. When NOT to retry

The single most-broken retry implementation is "retry on any error." From Google SRE Book Ch. 22:

Use clear response codes... separate retriable and nonretriable error conditions. Don't retry permanent errors or malformed requests in a client, because neither will ever succeed. Return a specific status when overloaded so that clients and other layers back off and do not retry.

HTTP status	Retry?	Why
200/2xx	n/a	Success
400 Bad Request	No	Malformed; never succeeds
401 Unauthorized	No	Need new credentials, not a retry
403 Forbidden	No	Auth issue, not transient
404 Not Found	No	Doesn't exist
409 Conflict (idempotency in progress)	Sometimes	Wait then check final state, not blind retry
422 Unprocessable	No	Malformed input
429 Too Many Requests	Yes	Honor Retry-After header
500 Internal Server Error	Cautiously	May be permanent (bug); limit attempts
502 Bad Gateway	Yes	Upstream blip
503 Service Unavailable	Yes	Honor Retry-After; expect overload
504 Gateway Timeout	Cautiously	Already cost time; deadline may be up

Network-layer rules:

• Connection refused / DNS failure: retry (likely transient)
• TLS handshake failure: do not retry the same request — likely a configuration issue
• Read timeout on non-idempotent request: do not retry without idempotency key
• Read timeout on idempotent request: retry
• Write succeeded but read timed out: same as above — idempotency key or it's not safe

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5. Deadline propagation

From Google SRE Book Ch. 22:

A common theme in many cascading outages is that servers spend resources handling requests that will exceed their deadlines on the client. As a result, resources are spent while no progress is made: you don't get credit for late assignments with RPCs.

With deadline propagation, a deadline is set high in the stack (e.g., in the frontend). The tree of RPCs emanating from an initial request will all have the same absolute deadline. For example, if server A selects a 30-second deadline, and processes the request for 7 seconds before sending an RPC to server B, the RPC from A to B will have a 23-second deadline.

The shape:

async function handle(req, ctx) {
  // ctx.deadline is an absolute timestamp set at the edge
  const remaining = ctx.deadline - Date.now()
  if (remaining <= 0) throw new Error('deadline exceeded before work started')

  // Pass remaining as the timeout to downstream, NOT a fresh 30s
  const downstream = await fetchWithTimeout(url, { timeout: remaining })
  // ...
}

In gRPC, deadlines are first-class on the context. In HTTP, propagate via header (X-Request-Deadline-Ms, grpc-timeout if you've adopted that convention) or via tracing baggage.

The rule: never set a fresh timeout downstream. Always pass min(local_budget, remaining_deadline).

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6. The combined recipe (Resilience4j + Polly + DIY)

// Pseudocode — language-agnostic
async function callWithResilience(req, ctx) {
  return circuitBreaker.execute(async () => {
    let lastErr
    for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 3; attempt++) {  // per-request budget
      const remaining = ctx.deadline - Date.now()
      if (remaining <= 0) throw new DeadlineExceeded()

      try {
        return await callWithTimeout(req, Math.min(remaining, 5000))
      } catch (err) {
        lastErr = err
        if (!isRetriable(err)) throw err               // non-retriable: stop
        if (!retryBudget.tryConsume()) throw err       // per-client 10% budget
        const delay = Math.floor(Math.random() * Math.min(30_000, 100 * 2 ** attempt))
        await sleep(Math.min(delay, ctx.deadline - Date.now()))
      }
    }
    throw lastErr
  })
}

The retryBudget is a token bucket over the last 2 minutes that allows requests * 0.10 retries per window. When exhausted, retries skip.

From Google SRE Book Ch. 21 (adaptive throttling formula)

Client tracks requests and accepts over the last 2 minutes. Client-side rejection probability:

max(0, (requests - K * accepts) / (requests + 1))

K = 2 is the recommended default ("we generally prefer the 2× multiplier"). The client itself drops requests before they reach the wire when the upstream is rejecting too many.

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Anti-patterns

Anti-pattern	Why it bites	Fix
Retry without circuit breaker	When upstream is down, retries hammer it	Wrap retries in a breaker; respect OPEN state
Circuit breaker without slow-call detection	Trips only after errors start; too late	Enable slow-call rate threshold (Resilience4j default off — turn on)
Retry at every layer	3 retries × 4 layers = 64× amplification	Retry only at the layer immediately above the failing dependency
No-jitter exponential backoff	Synchronizes retry storms	Full Jitter
Retrying 4xx errors	Will never succeed	Whitelist retriable status codes (5xx + 429) only
Fresh timeout per hop	Total wallclock balloons; deadline ignored	Propagate deadlines; pass min(budget, remaining)
maxAttempts: 100	Useless — by attempt 10 the upstream is gone	Cap at 3 (or 5 max for highly transient infra)
Hystrix in 2026	Netflix EOL'd it in 2018	Resilience4j (JVM), Polly (.NET), or hand-rolled per-language
Retrying non-idempotent POST without idempotency key	Risk of duplicate side effects	Add idempotency key OR don't retry
Open-state ignored by retry loop	Retries through CallNotPermittedException defeating the breaker	Retry loop must short-circuit on breaker rejection

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Novice / Expert / Timeline

	Novice	Expert
First retry	for (let i=0; i<5; i++) await call()	Full Jitter + 3-attempt cap + 10% client budget
Adds circuit breaker	Custom counter, no half-open	Resilience4j with slow-call threshold + half-open probes
Cascading failure postmortem	"Add more retries"	"Remove retries from N-2 layers; add deadline propagation"
On 503 with Retry-After	Ignores header	Honors header; backs off at minimum the suggested duration
Chooses backoff	Constant 1s	Full jitter exponential capped at 30s

Timeline test: how long after a downstream blip does retry traffic from your service stop? Expert answer: bounded by cap (e.g., 30s). Novice answer: until the blip ends — meaning retries kept the dependency overloaded longer than the original incident.

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Quality gates

A resilience change ships when:

• Test: Retry loop short-circuits on CallNotPermittedException (or breaker-equivalent); verified by integration test that opens the breaker and confirms zero downstream calls.
• Test: Backoff includes randomization — two parallel client instances do not retry at the same wallclock instant; verified statistically over 100 runs.
• Test: Per-request attempt cap is enforced; verified by a downstream that fails persistently and counting attempts.
• Test: Per-client retry budget exists (token bucket or rolling-ratio) and is observable via metric.
• Test: Non-retriable errors (4xx except 429) do not trigger retries; integration test for each.
• Test: Deadline propagation — downstream receives a header/context with the remaining budget, not a fresh timeout.
• Test: Circuit breaker slowCallRateThreshold is configured (Resilience4j default disabled); verify in config.
• Test: Retry-After header (when present) is parsed and honored.
• Manual: Game day or chaos test exercises the breaker with a fault-injected dependency; observe the recovery curve.

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Deterministic Audit

Before shipping a resilience change (or reviewing another agent's), write the plan as a
JSON object matching schemas/circuit-breaker-retry-plan.schema.json and run it through
scripts/circuit_breaker_retry_audit.mjs:

node scripts/circuit_breaker_retry_audit.mjs --input examples/sample-input.json

auditCircuitBreakerRetry(plan) encodes this skill's amplification math and Quality
Gates as deterministic rules over structured fields — no keyword matching: retries with
no circuit breaker, retries at more than one layer (the 64× product), no-jitter or
equal-jitter backoff, a missing or over-10% per-client retry budget, retry loops that
tunnel through CallNotPermittedException, retrying 4xx, fresh timeouts per hop instead
of propagated deadlines, non-idempotent retries without an idempotency key, and Hystrix
in 2026. It returns { pass, score, findings, recommendations }.
examples/sample-input.json is a single-layer Resilience4j plan with full-jitter
backoff and both SRE budgets (pass: true) Version history lives in CHANGELOG.md.

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NOT for this skill

• Bulkhead / thread-pool isolation (use bulkhead-isolation-design)
• Hedged requests (use hedged-request-design)
• Rate limiting on the server side (use rate-limiting-strategy)
• Backpressure protocols (use backpressure-design)
• Specific service mesh resilience config (use istio-resilience-config or linkerd-retry-policies)
• Database-specific retry (deadlock retry, serialization-failure retry — use postgres-isolation-and-retries)

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Sources

• Resilience4j: Circuit Breaker and Retry
• Microsoft Azure Architecture Center: Circuit Breaker pattern
• Marc Brooker, AWS: Exponential Backoff and Jitter and the simulator
• Google SRE Book: Ch. 21 — Handling Overload (per-request + per-client retry budgets, adaptive throttling)
• Google SRE Book: Ch. 22 — Addressing Cascading Failures (retry amplification math, deadline propagation, graceful degradation)
• Amazon Builders' Library: Timeouts, Retries, and Backoff with Jitter